In Using Leaders as Insider Witnesses Without Prosecuting Them, the Special Court for Sierra Leone May Have Legitimised Impunity by Pamsm-Conteh, Ishmail
8th International Scientific Forum, ISF 2017, 7-8 September 2017, UNCP, USA,   Proceedings 
140 
In Using Leaders as Insider Witnesses Without 
Prosecuting Them, the Special Court for Sierra Leone 





LLB (Law); University of Sunderland, MSc. (Criminal Justice Policy); 
London School of Economics, PhD Candidate; University of Leeds, UK 
 
Doi: 10.19044/esj.2017.c1p13    URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.19044/esj.2017.c1p13 
 
Abstract 
 There is a determination on the part of the international community 
that perpetrators of crimes during conflicts should not escape punishment for 
the roles they play during crises by either committing these offences 
themselves or by authorising their commission for such actions.  Since most 
crimes are not documented, which makes it hard to acquire the proof or 
evidence required for conviction, the courts or tribunals rely on the testimony 
of individuals who witnessed the crimes that have been committed. Such 
individuals are known as insider witnesses. In cooperating with the 
prosecution, if they themselves had been among the perpetrators or part of the 
accomplices, they are sometimes given, though not in all cases, a reduced 
sentence, as part of the plea bargain with the prosecution. However, agreeing 
to testify does not exempt one from punishment. This is because there is an 
underlying principle that individuals who commit such crimes must be held 
accountable; the same principle is aimed at ending impunity for crimes 
committed during conflicts such as these that offend international law. 
The Mandate of Special Court for Sierra Leone was to prosecute those 
individuals who bear the greatest responsibility…, including those leaders 
who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment of and 
implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.1 However, Prosecutors 
at various stages of the trials engaged some of these leaders as insider 
witnesses, without prosecuting them. Consequently, these leaders evaded 
punishment for their alleged crimes. In this process, the Special Court may 
have legitimised impunity. 
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1 Article 1(1) of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
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Introduction 
 Sierra Leone was ravaged by a civil war that lasted between 1991 and 
2002, resulting in an estimated 70,000 casualties and 2.6 million displaced 
persons.2 The war was characterized by widespread atrocities, including 
forced recruitment of child soldiers, extensive incidences of rape, sexual 
slavery and amputation of limbs.3 Various peace processes, facilitated by the 
international community, which were aimed at ending the war between the 
Sierra Leone Government and the main protagonists, the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) rebel group, were unsuccessful. These failed peace 
processes include the Abidjan Peace Agreement reached on 30th November, 
1996, which stipulated that a general amnesty be granted to the RUF rebel 
group, ordering them to disarm and form a political party.4 The date of the 
Abidjan peace agreement was of great significance, as the United Nations 
Security Council accepted it as the temporal jurisdiction for the Court, being 
the first comprehensive peace agreement that was reached between the RUF 
rebels and the Government of Sierra Leone. 
 Other protagonists in the conflict were members of the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC), an offshoot of the main Sierra Leone Army 
(SLA). This group later formed a military government with the RUF rebels 
after the overthrow of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) civilian 
government of President Tejan Kabba by a military coup on 25th of May, 1997.  
Another group was the civil militia known as the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), 
which was fighting on the side of the SLPP government. There was also the 
international peace keeping troop under   different nomenclatures, such as 
ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), United Nations Observer Mission 
in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), and   the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL) peace keepers. 
 This article aims at discussing that in using leaders as insider witnesses 




                                                          
2 Mary Kaldor with James Vincent, `United Nations Development Programme Evaluation 
Office`, EVALUATION OF UNDP ASSISTANCE TO CONFLICT AFFECTED 
COUNTRIES; CASE STUDY SIERRA LEONE. 
p.4<http://web.undp.org/evaluation/documents/thematic/conflict/SierraLeone.pdf> accessed 
18 August 2017 
3 ibid 
4 UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE. Peace Agreement Digital Collection, Sierra 
Leone>> Peace 
Agreement.https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreeme
nts/sierra_leone_11301996.pdf, accessed 18 August 2017 
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Background to Establishing the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
 The Special Court for Sierra Leone (hereinafter referred to as the 
Court, the Special Court) was created out of a letter dated the 12th of June, 
2000, when President Kabba in his address to the President of the UN Security 
Council and the international community requested for the establishment of a 
“Special Court for Sierra Leone.”5 The first paragraph of the letter partly reads 
thus: 
“On behalf of the Government and people of the Republic of Sierra 
Leone, I write to request you initiate a process whereby the United 
Nations would resolve on the setting up of a special court for Sierra 
Leone. The purpose of such a court is to try and bring to credible justice 
those members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and their 
accomplices responsible for committing crimes against the people of 
Sierra Leone and for the taking of United Nations peacekeepers as 
hostages.6 
 This request was met with the Council’s favourable response and 
within 8 weeks. On the 14th of August, 2000, the United Nation Security 
Council passed a Resolution 1315(2000),7 instructing the United Nations 
Sectary General of the time, Kofi Anan, to negotiate an agreement with the 
Kabba government that should be aimed at establishing the Court. On the 16th 
January, 2002, a formal bi-lateral agreement was signed in Freetown between 
the United Nations, represented by its Assistant Secretary-General for Legal 
Affairs, Hans Corell, and the Government of Sierra Leone represented by its 
Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Solomon Berewa.8 Annexed to the 
agreement was the Statute of the Court.9 This agreement set out the legal 
framework for a mixed Court, which featured both local and international 
elements, whilst taking into account some of the experiences of the already 
functional sister tribunals of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda 
(ICTR). For example, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) for the 
                                                          
5  President   of  the Republic of Sierra Leone, Annex to the letter dated 12 June 2000, 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2000/786/   < 
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Establishment/S-2000-786.pdf > accessed 3 July 2017 
6 ibid 
7The United Nations Security Council Resolution, `1315(2000) UN Doc. S/RES/1315(2000), 
14August 2000. http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Establishment/S-Res-1315-2000.pdf  
accessed 12 January 2017  
8 William Schabas` The UN International Criminal Tribunals The former Yugoslavia, Rwanda 
and Sierra Leone (First Published 2006, Cambridge University Press) pp, 38-39  
9 The Agreement between the GOSL and the UN,  on establishing the court was signed on 16 
January 2002, came into effect on 12 April 2002, 
<http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/SCSL/SierraLeoneUNAgreement.pdf >accessed 3 July 
2017 
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Court under Article 14(1) were mutatis mutanda to the ICTR, as a result of 
this experience.10 Whilst the ICTY and ICTR were established under a Chapter 
VII mandate of the UN Security Council,11 the Court was established in 
similarity to the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, as a 
bilateral agreement between the UN and the individual countries.  
 
The Global Community’s Effort to End Impunity after Conflicts 
 Since the Nuremberg Trials of 1945 and 1946, there has been a 
concerted effort, whether by treaty, customary law practice, resolutions or 
through legislation, by the global community and other organisations, 
including the UN, human right organisations, civil right activists and the likes, 
to hold to account individuals who commit crimes during conflicts. This 
position is reflected in Rule 158 (Prosecution of war crimes) of International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL), which states; “States must investigate war crimes 
allegedly committed by their nationals or armed forces, on their territories, and 
if appropriate, prosecute the suspects.”12  
 This position has been unequivocal as was reiterated in the speech by 
the former UN Sectary General, Ban Ki Moon, on 31st of May 2010: 
“In this new age of accountability, those who commit the worst of 
human” crimes will be held responsible. Whether they are rank and file 
foot soldiers or military commanders, whether they are lowly civil 
servants following orders, or top political leaders, they will be held 
accountable.” ... Let it be known as the place where the international 
community, coming together in concert, closed the door on the era of 
impunity and, acting in concert, ushered the age of accountability.”13 
 It was, therefore, no surprise that after the Balkans war and the 
Rwandan Genocide, in the late 1980s to early 1990’s, the world appalled by 
the atrocities committed during those conflicts, the UN and the international 
community established the ICTY in 1993 and the ICTR in 1994, respectively. 
The establishment of the International Criminal Court through the Rome 
Statute, which was enforced on 1st July, 2002, and the various ad hoc courts 
                                                          
10  Article 14(1) of the Statute of the Court, reads, “The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda obtaining at the time of the establishment of 
the Special Court shall be applicable mutatis mutandis to the conduct of the legal proceedings 
before the Special Court.” 
11 Schabas (n 8), p. 49 
12  International Humanitarian Law, Data Base, < https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/print/v1_cha_chapter44_rule158> accessed 17 August 2017 
13 United Nations Secretary General Bank Ki-Moon, Address to the Review Conference on 
the International Criminal Court,Kampala-
Ugandaon31May2010<http://www.un.org/africarenewal/web-features/secretary-
general%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9C-age-accountability%E2%80%9D-address-icc-review-
conference>accessed  17 August 2017 
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elsewhere in the world, are all geared towards this same goal of; ending 
impunity and holding individuals to account for the crimes they commit. 
Considering the heinous crimes that were committed in Sierra Leone, it was 
inevitable that those individuals responsible for perpetuating such crimes 
would be held to account eventually.  
 
The key Objective of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1315 
(2000) 
 The Resolution at paragraph 6, states, “…the Special Court shall have 
personal jurisdiction over persons who bear the greatest responsibility…, 
including those leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the 
establishment of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.”14 
 The UN Sectary General, during the negotiations, with the UN 
Security Council in establishing the Court had accepted that “persons who 
bear the greatest responsibility” did not limit jurisdiction to political and 
military leaders only, instead going by the determination of the phrase, it falls 
initially to the Prosecutor and ultimately to the Court itself.`15 As the phrase 
was not defined in the UN Resolution, the matter  for  interpretation of the 
phrase, “persons who bear the greatest responsibility,” came before Trial 
Chamber I through  a defence motion  about  the Court’s lack of personal 
jurisdiction under Article 1(1),16  in  Prosecutor v. Fofana.17 His defence 
counsel submitted that the Court did not have personal jurisdiction over 
Fofana, because the suspect fell outside the category of persons “who bore the 
greatest responsibility” for alleged violations of serious international 
humanitarian law contained in his indictment. In its ruling, the Chamber held: 
“While those ‘most responsible’ obviously include the political or 
military leadership, others in command authority down the chain of 
command may also be regarded as ‘most responsible’ judging by the 
severity of the crime or its massive scale... [I]t must be seen, however, 
not as a test criterion or a distinct jurisdictional threshold, but as 
guidance to the Prosecutor in the adoption of   a prosecution strategy 
and in making decisions to prosecute individuals”18 
                                                          
14 This wording in the Article 15(1) of the Statute do not describe an element of the crime, but 
rather provided guidance to the Prosecutor in determining his or her prosecutorial strategy. 
see UN Doc S/2000/40/paragraph 3. 
15  Kirsten Ainley, Rebekka Friedman and Chris Mahony ` Evaluating Transitional Justice, 
Accountability and Peacebuilding in Post- Conflict Sierra Leone, (First Published 2015 by 
MACMILLAN PALGRAVE) p. 87 
16 (n 1) 
17Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT (Preliminary Defence Motion- Matters 
Requiring Factual Determination), 3 March 2004 
18 Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT. 3 March 2004, para 22 
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 In other words, the Prosecutor’s responsibility in investigating and 
prosecuting `those who bear the greatest responsibility` should not only 
include the political or military leaders, but also those who committed severe 
and grave offences or the massive scale of the offences, as a corollary to the 
UN Sectary General’s assertion of `most responsible`. 
 The Court only indicted thirteen individuals; two died before they 
stood trial, one died during the trial, and the fate of another is still unknown. 
At the end, the Court only prosecuted nine individuals.19 It has been argued 
that because only a few individuals faced prosecution, the Court 
underachieved its mandate. The reason for this emanates from the fact that, 
considering the war that lasted for eleven years together with the scale and 
brutality of the atrocities committed, the general expectation of Sierra 
Leoneans was that more people should have been prosecuted. The counter 
argument to this was that the Court was meant to last for only a few years and 
the funding structure also influenced the number of persons prosecuted. 
 
Defining an Insider Witness 
 During any post conflict period, it is usually very difficult to acquire 
hard evidence to assist in the prosecution of alleged perpetrators, as these 
atrocities are hardly documented. The courts or tribunals would therefore rely 
on insiders to provide valuable information regarding the alleged crimes 
committed and the identity of the perpetrators who committed them. Persons 
who were close to the accused are called `insider witnesses`, as explained by 
the ICTY; “The evidence gained from their testimony is often crucial for the 
establishing of the degree of responsibility of the accused.”20 Former 
Prosecutor at the ICTY and ICTR, Carla Del Ponte, also explains, “Insider 
witnesses are persons in a position to provide crucial, high grade information 
about political and military decision making, because they had witnessed 
events at close proximity to the decision makers.”21 Anne Marie de Brueller 
and Allette Smuelle also stated, “…Insider witnesses are usually accomplices 
to the crimes with which the accused were charged.”22 
                                                          
19 The Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
Website http://www.rscsl.org/index.html accessed 17 August 2017 
20 United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Website page 
on` Witnesses` http://www.icty.org/en/about/registry/witnesses accessed 30/12/2016 
21 Carla Del Ponte with Chuck Sudetic, `  Madame Prosecutor Confrontations with Humanity’s 
Worst Criminals and the culture of Impunity` (Published 2008, Other Press New York) p. 128 
22 Anne Marie de Brouwers and Alette Smeulers, The Elga Companion to the International 
Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda. (Edward Elgar Publishers 2016),p. 248 
8th International Scientific Forum, ISF 2017, 7-8 September 2017, UNCP, USA,   Proceedings 
146 
 Prosecutors David Crane,23 Stephen Rapp24 and Brenda Hollis,25 were 
United States (US) citizens, who also happened to be the lead Prosecutors as 
at when the trials began and at different stages of the judicial activities of the 
Special Court. It should be safe to assume that their prosecutorial strategy 
might have been influenced by the US judicial system. Therefore, it is thus 
worth mentioning of the US policy on insider witness. It states thus: 
“This policy recognizes that persons who have committed serious 
crimes should not be allowed to avoid all penal sanctions by agreeing 
to testify. At the same time, the policy gives the “insider” hope that at 
the end of the process, the insider will still have the opportunity to start 
a new life. It is the collective judgment of the United States that the 
cost of allowing reduced sentences for cooperation against leaders of 
the criminal organization is justified by the need to defeat the criminal 
organizations that pose such serious threat to civil society.”26 
 This policy would be referred to again as the paper is discussed. 
 
The Use of Leaders as Insider Witnesses at the Court 
 The Prosecutor’s strategy at the Court of using leaders as insider 
witnesses, without prosecuting them, has come under scrutiny in the context 
of prosecuting those “who bear the greatest responsibility,” for these reasons: 
(A) The competence of the Court, which was to prosecute individuals who 
committed grave or serious offences, and the leaders who in committing 
offences threatened the establishment and implementation of the peace 
process in Sierra Leone; (B) by cooperating with the prosecution, individuals 
should not be allowed to escape punishment for their alleged crime, as 
encapsulated in the US policy on insider witness already quoted. 
 Amongst the insider witnesses who testified at the Court were; Gibril 
Massaquoi, in Prosecutor v Sesay, Kallon and Gbao (RUF Trials),27 George 
Johnson aka. Junior Lion, in Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara and Kanu (AFRC 
Trials),28 Albert Nallo in Prosecutor v Norman, Fofana and Kondewa (CDF 
Trials),29 and Moses Blah in the Prosecutor v Taylor (Charles Taylor Trial).30 
The first two mentioned individuals did not only occupy leadership roles in 
                                                          
23  Prosecutor April 2002 to July 2005 
24 Prosecutor January 2007 to September 2009 
25 Prosecutor February 2010 to  2013 
26 Robert Courtney III, ` INSIDERS AS COOPORATING WITNESES: OVERCOMING 
FEAR AND OFFERING HOPE`p.39.  
http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_GG4_Seminar/Fourth_GGSeminar_P36-46.pdf  
accessed 16 August 2017 
27 Prosecutor v Sesay, Kallon and Gbao (RUF Trial), Case No.  SCSL-04-15 
28 Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara and Kanu (AFRC Trial) Case No. SCSL -04-16 
29Prosecutor v Norman, Fofana and Kondewa (CDF Trial), Case No. SCSL 04-14 
30 Prosecutor v Charles Taylor (Taylor Trial), Case No. SCSL 03-01 
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their various organisations, but they also admitted or were found to have taken 
part in the crimes for which others were being prosecuted. This is supported 
by the Judgement in the RUF trials, which reads: 
“…These insider witnesses were themselves high ranking officers in 
the RUF or AFRC. Many of these witnesses were key participants to 
the crimes alleged in the Indictment, and may be considered to be co-
perpetrators or accomplices. The Chamber reiterates that the Appeals 
Chamber has clarified that such persons may be considered 
accomplices even if they have not been charged with any criminal 
offences.”31 
 It is against this backdrop that the question is asked, whether the 
Prosecutor’s strategy was robust enough, by using leaders, who have been 
accused of committing alleged crimes, to serve as insider witnesses, whilst 
evading prosecution. Their alleged crimes and roles as insider witnesses are 
now considered in turns: 
 
Gibril Massaquoi 
 The Country’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in its final 
report found that, Massaquoi approximately executed 24 innocent people in 
the Pujehun district.32 The report further states, “Sankoh's "Special Assistant", 
Gibril Massaquoi, personally fuelled the tensions surrounding the UNAMSIL 
hostage-taking crisis. He was a central part of the chain of command of the 
RUF. Massaquoi bears an individual share of the responsibility for the 
deterioration in the security situation in Sierra Leone.”33  Massaquoi served as 
a key witness at the RUF trials, and his testimony was significant to the 
successful conviction of those RUF leaders who were prosecuted by the Court, 
even though he himself was a leader within the RUF rebel movement as was 
found in the TRC report. 
 
George Johnson 
 From the AFRC Trial, this part of the transcript of George Johnson’s 
testimony is hereby reproduced. His answers have been highlighted in bolded 
fonts for emphasis: 
1 A. Yes, his a.k.a. name was Gullit.  
2 Q. You said you were appointed to the position of provost  
3 marshal by Alex Tamba Brima in Mansofinia. Before that, what  
4 position had you held?  
                                                          
31  RUF Trial Judgement SCSL-04-15-T, delivered 2 March 2009, para. 539 
32 TRC report. Volume two, chapter two, at paragraph 
156.http://www.sierraleonetrc.org/index.php/view-report-text-vol-2/item/volume-two-
chapter-two?category_id=20 accessed 05 January 2017 
33  ibid TRC Report para. 166  
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10:58:02 5 A. Before that, I was still the chief security officer to  
6 Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara in Kono. As a lieutenant.  
7 Q. Moving on, to still in the year 1998, were there any  
8 further alterations to the appointments you held in that year  
9 that you are able to recall?  
10:58:32 10 A. Yes, at Camp Rosos, I was given a battalion to 
command.  
11 Q. Who gave you the battalion to command?  
12 A. Alex Tamba Brima, a.k.a Gullit.  
13 Q. Do you remember the battalion number?  
14 A. It was the 4th Battalion. 34 
 
His testimony continues: 
19 A. After the burial of SAJ Musa, we only spent two days there.  
09:59:47 20 Q. Where did you go after that?  
21 A. We went into the Peninsular Hills to Hastings.  
22 Q. Did anything happen at Hastings?  
23 A. Yes, Hastings was first attacked.  
24 Q. Do you know who led that attack?  
10:00:04 25 A. It was led by me.  
26 Q. What was the purpose of that attack?  
27 A. The purpose of the attack was for us to go and get more  
28 arms and ammunitions from the Nigerians because it was their  
29 headquarter. 35 
 
 It is hereby appropriate to again reiterate that President Kabba’s 
request to the UN for establishing the Court, amongst other reasons, was to 
prosecute those who attacked and kidnapped the international peace keepers. 
The offence of direct intentional attack on peace keepers36 was to become a 
specific offence under international humanitarian law, for the very first time 
at an international court. 
 
Albert Jusu Nallo 
 Albert Jusu Nallo, as Deputy National Coordinator, occupied a high 
position in the CDF hierarchy. At the CDF trial, he testified against his 
subordinate, Allieu Kondewa. The usual practice according to previous 
international tribunals was for those persons who occupy lower position in the 
cadre of the organisation to testify against their leaders, and not the other way 
round. In the event where leaders testify against their subordinates, they 
                                                          
34 AFRC Trial, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-T, 15 September 2005, p.10 
35 AFRC Trial, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-T, 15 September 2005, p.14 
36 Article 4(b) of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
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should not be excused from punishment, as the case of Jean Kambanda at the 
ICTY, which has been discussed below, would show. Tim Kelsall wrote, 
“…He (Nallo) claimed to have sat with Moinina Fofana37 to plan strategies for 
war operations and that he wrote down these strategies and passed it to others 
to implement.”38 As a planner and a leader, even if he did not physically 
commit an offence, but being under command and bearing superior 
responsibility, he should have been captured under the umbrella of, “those 
who bear the greatest responsibility,” for the crimes under the jurisdiction of 
the Court. 
 
Moses Blah  
 At the Charles Taylor trial, the use of his Vice President, Moses Blah, 
as an `insider witness` should be justified because of three reasons: (A) He 
was subordinate to Charles Taylor. (B) It was alleged that he (Charles Taylor) 
had executed most of the members of his inner circle, and there were very few 
if any who would have been in the position to provide the information the 
Court sought in order to carry a successful conviction.39 Indeed, the 
prosecution claims that some members of the accused’s inner circle were 
murdered because they were aware of the crimes perpetrated by the accused 
and they stood as potential threats in exposing him (Charles Taylor). 40 
Moreover, many individuals associated with the Taylor regime were afraid to 
testify for the defence due to the fear of being subjected to a UN-imposed 
travel ban and seizure of their assets had they attended the Court.41 (C) There 
was no evidence suggesting that Blah had committed crimes that fell within 
the jurisdiction of the Court for which he was to be prosecuted.   
 It is hereby appropriate to draw a few comparisons on how the Court 
engaged insider witnesses, as opposed to the sister tribunals of the ICTY and 
ICTR. 
 At the ICTY for example, the following individuals served as insider 
witnesses but they were not exempted from prosecution: 
 Miroslav Bralo was a member of a Military Police unit of the Croatian 
Defence Council. Bralo committed a range of appalling crimes and was 
convicted of killing five people and of assisting the killing of 14 Bosnian 
Muslim civilians, nine of whom were children. The Trial Chamber believed 
                                                          
37 Moninina Fofana was one of the Accused Persons in the CDF Trial  
38 TIM KELSALL, CULTURE UNDER CROSS-EXAMINATION: INTERNATIONAL 
JUSTICE AND THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE (Published 2009, Cambridge 
University Press,) P.99 
39 Gill Wigglesworth` The End of Impunity? Lessons from Sierra Leone` page 820 
http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~wggray/Teaching/His300/Handouts/Wigglesworth-Sierra-
Leone.pdf  accessed 12 August  2017 
40 Wigglesworth (n 39) p.820 
41ibid 
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that it was noteworthy when he admitted to crimes of which he was not 
originally charged with and that he made efforts to atone for his crimes by 
engaging in community work and assisting in the location of the remains of 
some of his victims. He was subsequently sentenced to 20 years’ 
imprisonment.42 
 Dragan Zelenović was a Bosnian Serb soldier and de facto military 
policeman in the town of Foča, Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992. Zelenović 
raped and tortured a number of detained Muslim women and girls, including 
a 15-year-old. Women who resisted his sexual assaults were threatened with 
death or were beaten. As part of the plea agreement, he agreed to provide 
truthful and complete information and to testify at any proceedings before the 
ICTY. He was later sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment.43 
 Predrag Banović was a guard at the Keraterm detention camp in 
Prijedor, Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992.  He participated in the abuse and 
persecution of non-Serb detainees within the camp. He murdered five 
prisoners as a result of his participation in beatings and also beat up 27 
detainees with baseball bats, truncheons, cables, and iron balls. Banović was 
sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment.44 In his guilty plea statement, he states, 
“I feel sorry for all the victims, and I curse my own hands for having inflicted 
pain in any way on innocent people. I wish my sincere words to be understood 
as a balm for those wounds and as a contribution to the reconciliation of all 
people in Prijedor and the restoration of the situation that existed before the 
war.” 45 
 At the ICTR, the case of former Prime Minister Jean Kambanda, who 
was prosecuted as a leader   is worthy of mentioning. He had testified against 
others including former ministers, government officials including members of 
the military.46 He was found guilty of the crimes he committed and sentenced 
to life imprisonment.  The Trial Chambers in passing Judgment stated this: 
“The Chamber recalls as aforementioned that the Tribunal was 
established at the request of the government of Rwanda; and the 
Tribunal was intended to enforce individual criminal accountability on 
behalf of the international community, contribute in ensuring the 
effective redress of violence and the culture of impunity, and foster 
national reconciliation and peace in Rwanda. (Preamble, Security 
Council resolution 955(1994)).”47 
                                                          
42 Prosecutor v Miroslav Bralo   Case No. IT-95-17 820 
43  Prosecutor v Dragan Zelenovic   Case No. IT-96-23/2 
44  Prosecutor v Predrag Banovic Case No. IT-02-65-1 
45 ibid 
46  Prosecutor v Jean Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 99-54-A-T 
47  ibid, Trial Judgement, 22 January 2004, para. 59 
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 Another example is the case of Prosecutor v Omar Serushago,48 who 
did not only volunteer to the authorities; he also cooperated with the 
Prosecutor[RT1]. He was sentenced to 15 years in prison, despite his surrender 
and corporation and his not being a leader, but a middle level perpetrator.  Yet 
another example is the case of Prosecutor v Georges Ruggiu. Mr Ruggiu who 
cooperated with the Prosecutor as well and entered a guilty plea earlier in his 
trial, and also testified against others; notwithstanding that fact, he received a 
20-year prison sentence.  
 Suffice it to say, it is even possible that Massaquoi, Johnson, and Nallo 
were rewarded by the Court when they were provided with incentives to serve 
as witnesses and for subsequent relocation together with their families out of 
the country as part of the Witness and Victim Services (WVS) programme.49 
The basis for suggesting these lies or rests in the Court’s policy on financial 
incentives for witnesses who testify50 and as well as the Court’s policy on 
relocation of witnesses to a third country after testifying for the prosecution.51  
 The question remains, why would the Court, instead of prosecuting 
those leaders for their individual participation in the alleged committed 
crimes, allow them to evade prosecution? When in the Court’s own decision 
in Prosecutor v Taylor,52 it had stated that: 
“By reaffirming in the Preamble to Resolution 1315 `that persons who 
commit or authorize serious violations of international humanitarian 
law are individually responsible and accountable for those violations 
and that the international community will exert every effort to bring 
those responsible to justice in accordance with international standards 
of justice, fairness and due process of law...”53 
 The above ruling of the Court was a reiteration of not only the global 
community’s stance on ending impunity, but also the intent of the Court to 
carry out its mandate of prosecuting the perpetrators for the crimes allegedly 
                                                          
48 Prosecutor v Omar Serushago, Case No ICTR 98-39-T, Decision Relating to Guilty Plea 
14 December 1998, para 41 
49  Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara and Kanu Case No. SCSL 04-16-T, Trial Judgement 28 June 
2007 
50 Para 127 of the Court’s Practice Direction, ““…The Practice Direction provides for a wide 
range of allowances to be paid to witnesses testifying before the Special Court. These include 
an attendance allowance as compensation for earnings and time lost as a result of testifying, 
accommodation, meals transport, medical treatment, childcare and other allowances.” 
51 Paragraph 129 further reads, “Relocation to another country is a protection measure 
employed by WVS pursuant to its responsibility to provide protection for witnesses and 
victims who are at risk on account of the testimony given by them”51 
52 Prosecutor v Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-I, Decision on Immunity from Prosecution, 31 
May 2004 
53 Prosecutor v Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-I, Decision on Immunity from Prosecution, 31 
May 2004, para 39 
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committed, which fell within its jurisdiction. However, the Prosecutors were 
disinclined to acting this out, and the Chambers would only adjudicate on 
cases that were presented at court. Had these leaders who were alleged to have 
committed crime been prosecuted, maybe the argument that the Court did not 
prosecute enough leaders for the crimes committed in the eleven year civil war 
may not have been so pronounced. By not prosecuting these leaders, victims 
were also denied justice, and justice for the victims remains the paramount 
objective for instituting such tribunals, as well as to provide deterrent for 
potential perpetrators, in as much as punishing the perpetrators.   
 
Conclusion 
 The crimes committed during Sierra Leone’s brutal eleven year civil 
war saw the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone in 2002. The 
Court’s mandate under UN Security Council Resolution 1315(2000) was 
aimed at prosecuting those individuals who bear the greatest responsibility of 
serious offences under international humanitarian and Sierra Leone laws, 
including the leaders who had threatened the peace process. 
 In the absence of evidence to assist international courts or tribunals 
during trials, the testimony of insider witnesses is crucial, as their testimony 
might provide significant information on the crimes and the persons who 
allegedly committed them. The earliest tribunals of the ICTY and ICTR had 
established that even if insider witnesses cooperated with the prosecution, they 
themselves should not escape punishment. In the case where the court use a 
leader as an insider witness, that would not exempt that leader from 
punishment. A case in point is that of Jean Kambanda at the ICTR, though he 
cooperated with the prosecution, he nevertheless received the maximum 
punishment of a life sentence for the crimes he committed.  
 At the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Prosecutor’s strategy 
involved engaging leaders as insider witnesses, without prosecuting them. In 
the process, these leaders evaded punishment for the alleged crimes they 
themselves committed or authorised. The departure from international good 
practice established by earlier tribunals could be interpreted as a missed 
opportunity for the Court to accomplish its mandate of holding to account 
“those who bear the greatest responsibility,” of the crimes committed during 
the Sierra Leone conflict, which offended international humanitarian and 
Sierra Leone laws, as provided for under UN Security Council Resolution 
1315(2000).  
Furthermore, by not punishing those leaders for the heinous crimes 
they allegedly committed, the concerted effort of the global community to hold 
to account individuals who commit serious crimes during conflict may have 
been thwarted. This therefore leads to the inevitable conclusion that the Court 
may have legitimised impunity, thereby failing to align to the position of the 
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